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Abstract In most countries, publicly funded schools are held accountable to one
inspectorate and are judged against agreed national standards. Many inspectorates of
education have recently moved towards more proportional risk-based inspection
models, targeting high-risk schools for visits, while schools with satisfactory student
attainment levels are excluded from inspections. This paper looks into these newer
inspection models and aims to enhance our understanding of the potential effectiveness
of such targeted models on student attainment and other performance indicators.
Random effects models, analyzing changes in schools over time, indicate that targeted
inspections particularly have an effect on student attainment in literacy in weak schools,
while also impacting on student satisfaction, student numbers and student-staff ratios.
Keywords School inspections . School accountability . Educational effectiveness
1 Introduction
Good education is a major public interest and considered to be an important condition
for economic growth and general well-being. Many countries, therefore, pay consider-
able attention to the quality of their schools and try to improve their level of education.
School inspection is used by most European education systems as a major instrument
for controlling and promoting the quality of schools. As De Grauwe (2007, p. 6) notes:
School inspections are external evaluations of schools, undertaken by officials
outside of the school with a mandate from a national/local authority. Regular
visits of schools are an essential part of school inspections to collect information
about the quality of the school, check compliance to legislation and/or evaluate
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the quality of students’ work (e.g. through observations, interviews and document
analysis)’ (De Grauwe 2007, p. 6).
The Dutch Inspectorate of Education was established in 1801 and has seen many
changes over the years, particularly in the last decade (Inspectie van het Onderwijs/
Dutch Inspectorate of Education 2012). The most prominent change included the
introduction of risk-based inspections in 2008. Risks refer, according to De Wolf and
Honingh (2014), to potential problems and dangerous situations, such as failing
teaching quality and lack of good governance in schools. Risks are often based on
estimates of the gravity and seriousness of an event and the chances of such an event
occurring. Risk-based inspections start with an early warning analysis of all the
schools, using available information on possible risks of low educational quality in
schools, such as student achievement results on standardized tests and school docu-
ments. Schools with no risks are not scheduled for inspection visits, whereas schools
that show risks receive additional inspection monitoring and interventions. Risk-based
school inspections are expected to increase effectiveness of school inspections by
identifying potentially low-performing schools and increasing inspection activities in
these schools (and less inspection activities in well-performing schools) (Ehren and
Honingh 2011).
Thinking about risks as a starting point for school inspections has become more
common over the last years, according to DeWolf and Honingh (2014), and reflects the
need for more selective and targeted approaches. They reflect a change in the political
and economic situation (particularly the economic recession) and the need for more
efficient and effective school inspection models. Other European countries have also
developed more targeted approaches over the last years, and the Bratislava memoran-
dum of SICI (2013), the European Association of Inspectorates of Education, even
describes the need for inspectorates to be agile and focus on risks and proportionality as
one of the most important trends in school inspections across Europe. Examples of such
targeted models can be found in England where Ofsted adapts the frequency of
inspections to perceived need, such that schools judged satisfactory will be on a 3-
year cycle and schools judged as unsatisfactory will be visited more frequently (Allen
and Burgess 2012). Similar trends were described for Sweden, Northern Ireland,
Estonia and Ireland (Gray 2014).
The introduction of these targeted risk-based inspections has, however, not been
without criticism. De Wolf and Honingh (2014), for example, debate whether it is
possible to measure risks as they often represent ‘yesterday’s problems’. A risk-based
approach implies a strong focus on performance indicators, limiting the potential value
of professional judgement of school inspectors. De Wolf and Honingh (2014) describe
that the focus on specific risks as a starting point for inspections may bias judgements
of inspectors when they visit schools that have been identified to be potentially failing.
Early warning analysis and the assessment of potential failures often become self-
fulfilling prophecies when inspectors assess schools along the outcome of the early
warning analysis, instead of observing school and teaching quality with an open and
objective mind.
Ehren and Honingh (2011) also conclude that the focus on achievement in risk-
based inspections does not allow for an actual early warning of risks to prevent failing
quality in schools. As these authors indicate, the choice of student achievement results
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as the primary risk indicator implies an identification of schools that are already failing.
Inadequate teaching and leadership in these schools have led to low student achieve-
ment (and not the other way around). Warnings to prevent such failings, however, need
to identify schools before their student achievement results are below average and
should therefore include other indicators on, for example, internal quality control and
self-evaluations of schools to identify potential weaknesses in educational quality,
indicators on the quality of educational processes or other causes of failure (such as
substantive changes in student or teacher population).
The move towards risk-based inspections, focused on student outcomes, also seems
to limit the opportunities of school inspections to motivate school improvement as
many schools will not receive feedback on the quality of their teaching and school
organization anymore. Ehren and Honingh (2011) and De Wolf and Honingh (2014)
suggest that the strong and narrow focus on student outcomes in risk-based inspections
may even lead to undesirable gaming and manipulation of the performance indicators
used in the early warning analyses.
Evidence of such potential strategic responses is, however, limited as current studies
on the impact (both intended and unintended) of school inspections only address school
inspections, which include regular cyclical visits to and assessments of all schools. This
paper therefore aims to enhance our understanding of the impact of these proportionate
risk-based models of school inspections on secondary schools. We will explore if these
models lead to improved student outcomes as well as improvement of other performance
indicators (e.g. student and parent satisfaction) in Dutch secondary schools (higher
general secondary education (HAVO)/pre-university secondary education (VWO) track).
The following section first explains the structure of secondary education in the
Netherlands and how secondary schools are inspected in the Netherlands. A brief
literature review is then presented which reflects on the impact of school inspections
and informs the theoretical framework of the study.
2 Secondary education in the Netherlands
By the age of 12, Dutch children go to secondary education. Secondary education in the
Netherlands is strongly stratified into pre-vocational education (VMBO), individual-
ized pre-vocational education (VMBO and IVBO, age range 12–16 years), senior
general secondary education (HAVO, age range 12–17 years) and pre-university
education (VWO, age range 12–18 years). The choice for one of these tracks is made
by the pupil and its parents, using the advice from the primary school and the results of
a national standardized end of primary education test (the CITO-test).
A school building can offer all or just one of these tracks. This study only includes
(departments of) schools offering senior general secondary education and pre-
university education (HAVO and VWO), which is offered to approximately 40 % of
all the students in secondary education. Each educational track in secondary education
is generally led by a department head who is full time responsible for the daily
functioning and operation of each track and of the quality of education in each track.
EP-Nuffic (2015) describes the Dutch education system as one where the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Science is responsible financial structures, general education
policy and admission requirements, and structure and objectives of the education
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system. Under the authority of the Ministry of Education, learning objectives are
specified at the different stages and different tracks of the education system, but schools
are autonomous in deciding on appropriate teaching and learning methods and curric-
ulum design as long as they ensure the incorporation of these learning objectives
(Béguin and Ehren 2011).
The school-leaving exams at the end of secondary education assess whether students
meet the learning objects and qualify to graduate. These exams are composed of a
school-based exam (contributing to 50 % of the final grade) and a national standardized
test at the end of the final school year (also 50 % of the final grade).1 Students need to
take both school and national examination in seven subjects to qualify for a pre-
university (VWO) diploma and six subjects to qualify for a senior general secondary
education (HAVO) diploma (EP-Nuffic 2015). Dutch language is a compulsory subject
in the national examination in all types of secondary education. English language and
mathematics are also compulsory elements in the national examination in pre-university
and senior general secondary education. Students need to pass at least two of the three
basic subjects (English, Dutch language and mathematics) to qualify for a diploma.
The elements to be tested in each examination are, according to Béguin and Ehren
(2011), specified in the examination syllabus, approved by the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Science. The syllabus also specifies the number and length of the tests that
make up the national examination. Schools are responsible for setting up the school
examination; they develop and submit a school examination syllabus to the inspector-
ate, showing which elements will be tested, when, how marks are calculated, including
the weight allocated to these tests and resit opportunities. The school examination must
be completed, and the results were submitted to the inspectorate before the national
examinations start.
3 School inspections in the Netherlands
One of the hallmarks of the Dutch Education Inspectorate is the development and use
of risk-based inspections in 2008. Risk-based inspections have been common in other
sectors as a cost-effective method to select appropriate maintenance and inspections
tasks and techniques and to ensure a more proactive regime of inspections (Power
1999). Risk-based inspections of schools were considered appropriate in the Dutch
context as the autonomy of schools and developing structures of horizontal account-
ability required a less burdensome inspection system, but one that would allow the
inspectorate to quickly intervene in failing schools (see Ehren and Honingh 2011). The
risk-based model allowed the inspectorate to use annual early warning to target
potentially failing schools and schedule their inspection capacity for intensive moni-
toring of these schools.
As the inspectorate of education explains (20132), the early warning analyses are
implemented at a fixed moment in the year, after the student achievement data on
1 http://www.ncee.org/programs-affiliates/center-on-international-education-benchmarking/top-performing-
countries/netherlands-overview/netherlands-instructional-systems/
2 http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/binaries/content/assets/Documents+algemeen/2013/231213-
publ ieksve rs ie_waarde r ingskade r_vo_2013.pdf and ht tp : / /www.onderwi j s inspec t i e .
nl/binaries/content/assets/Documents+algemeen/2013/toezichtkader-vo-2013_versie-20131101.pdf (in Dutch)
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national examinations are made available by the national testing agency. In these
analyses, average student achievement results on the national examinations in all
subjects over a period of 3 years (corrected for socio-economic background of stu-
dents), annual performance data (on staff turnover, number of students and financial
viability of the school) and number of complaints of parents or in national and local
media are used to identify potentially failing schools. Students’ results on national
standardized examinations are the primary indicator in the analyses and are used to
classify schools into one of three categories: schools in the ‘green’ category are
considered to have no risks of failing, ‘orange’ schools have potential risks of failing,
whereas ‘red’ schools have high risks of failing.
Author (2012, p. 6) further describes and summarizes the methodology of risk-based
inspections:
The early warning analysis is used to classify schools in three categories; schools
in the ‘green; category are considered to have no risks of failing quality, ‘orange’
schools have potential risks of failing quality, whereas ‘red’ schools have high
risks of failing quality. The Inspectorate of Education schedules desk research in
schools in the orange category. These schools are requested to send in the student
achievement results of students in intermediate grades in reading and mathemat-
ics. The Inspectorate also analyses additional documents of the school, such as
annual reports. In case this desk research shows no risks (the documents are in
order and the intermediate results are sufficient and there are no indications of
risks); the school gets reassigned to the green category. The school board
however receives an informal warning in case the achievement of students in
the final grade is below average or is declining.
An interview with the school board is scheduled in case the desk research points
to potential risks. Potential risks are discussed during this interview, as well as the
capacity of the school board to address and solve these risks. An additional
inspection visit to the potentially failing school is scheduled in case this interview
does not provide the Inspectorate of Education with sufficient information or in
case the capacity of the school board to address the risks is evaluated as
inadequate. During this visit, the inspection framework is used to assess educa-
tional quality in the school as sufficient, failing or highly underdeveloped.
The Inspectorate of Education also schedules desk research of schools in the red
category, comparable to the desk research of schools in the orange category.
School boards of schools in the red category are also scheduled for an interview
and schools receive a full inspection visit to evaluate their educational quality.
Schools that are evaluated as failing or highly underdeveloped are scheduled for
additional inspection activities. The Inspectorate of Education instructs the school
board to formulate a plan of approach aimed at improving quality. The Inspec-
torate tests the plan and lays down performance agreements in an inspection plan.
This plan specifies when the quality should be up to par again and what (interim)
results the school must attain. It also specifies the indicators the Inspectorate of
Education will assess in (interim) inspection visits. The school board must
commit to the inspection plan. Failing schools that do not improve within two
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years end up in the regime imposed on highly underdeveloped schools. These
schools are confronted with additional inspection activities, such as a meeting
between the school board and the Inspectorate management or an official
warning. If these activities do not yield the result agreed upon, the Inspectorate
will report a highly underdeveloped school to the Minister, along with a proposal
for instating sanctions. On the basis of this report, the Minister may proceed to
impose administrative and/or financial sanctions.
4 Theoretical framework
Earlier reviews of Klerks (2013) and Nelson and Ehren (2014) note that little empirical
research has been conducted on the impact of inspection, particularly outside the UK
and the Netherlands. Of the available studies, only a limited number of studies look into
the impact of school inspection on student achievement. None of these studies,
however, address improvement of schools on other performance indicators, such as
student and parent satisfaction, student-teacher ratios, number of teaching hours or
teachers’ sick leave; available studies on student achievement also only look into
improved attainment in mathematics and literacy and neglect improvement in other
subject areas (e.g. geography, biology).
Notable studies on the impact of school inspections on student achievement include
Shaw et al. (2003), Rosenthal (2004), Luginbuhl et al. (2009), Allen and Burgess
(2012) and Hussain (2012). Shaw et al. (2003) found that achievement in (far) above-
and below-average performing English schools slightly improves after an inspection
visit. Inspection did not improve examination achievement in maintained comprehen-
sive schools. Rosenthal (2004) even found a decrease in examination results of students
in England in secondary education in the year of the inspection visit. He explains this
result by pointing to the extensive preparation of schools for the visit that may take time
and energy away from the teaching and learning process. Luginbuhl et al. (2009), on
the other hand, found an improvement in test scores of students in primary education,
particularly in schools with high proportions of disadvantaged students in arithmetic in
the first year following an inspection visit.
More recent reports presented by Allen and Burgess (2012) and Hussain (2012) are
based on separate, large, longitudinal datasets in England with a sophisticated process
for analysis. Both of these studies claim a link between the findings of an inspection
report and student achievement results and suggest that a negative inspection judge-
ment may prompt or accelerate actions to improve student performance, even where no
external interventions are made. Hussain also examined improvement in relation to
prior attainment, to control for ‘gaming’ by schools, for example, by failing to enter
students less likely to perform well or by targeting borderline students. Such types of
strategic behaviour have been described by numerous authors (e.g. Smith 1995; De
Wolf and Janssens 2007) and would include schools manipulating performance data
send to or collected by the inspectorate (e.g. to be included in the early warning
analyses). Hussain (2012) found no evidence in English schools to suggest such
gaming and found improvement for all students in the schools studied. Furthermore,
the improvement in student attainment was found to be maintained in student data for
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the following 3 years. These studies all reflect regular school inspections of all schools,
looking at the impact of visits and resulting assessments on student attainment. This
study particularly analyzes newer, more targeted risk-based models of inspections and
how these models affect changes on a broader set of indicators over a period of 3 years.
In this study, we are particularly interested in how school inspections impact on
outcomes of schools and how outcomes of schools change over time after schools have
been inspected and been placed in different inspection treatment categories. Our study
will broaden the previously used definitions of impact by also investigating changes in
other (peripheral) subject areas (e.g. geography, biology) and other performance indi-
cators included (to some extent) in the early warning analysis of the inspectorate of
education.
We expect schools in the weak and very weak inspection treatment to show more
improvements on these indicators compared to schools in the basic category, particu-
larly on indicators that are part of the early warning analysis such as school and exam
grades in core subjects (mathematics and literacy). There are a number of arguments
that underpin this assumption:
Weak and very weak schools are under increased inspection scrutiny to improve and
receive more frequent inspection visits in which their improvement on inspection
standards is monitored and targets are set around improvement of key inspection
indicators; they face sanctions when failing to improve within 2 to 3 years. Weak
and very weak schools also receive inspection feedback and support from other
organizations (e.g. external consultants and their school board) while implementing
their improvement plan. Moreover, schools in the basic category have less need and
room for improvement as they are placed in this inspection category because of already
relatively high levels of student attainment. Weak and very weak schools, on the other
hand, will have plenty of opportunity to improve as their students are performing below
what is expected of them given their entry level.
Several studies suggest that high levels of inspection scrutiny through visits,
feedback and consequences for failing have an effect on the improvement of
schools, both in raising the school’s awareness of relevant standards of education-
al quality, while also supporting the implementation of improvements. Hanushek
and Raymond (2002), for example, point to rational choice theory to describe how
standards, the thresholds in performance targets and related sanctions and rewards
may influence actions in schools. Standards, such as those in inspection frame-
works and early warning analyses, present the details of what is expected of
schools; they create boundaries or domains for attention with respect to educa-
tional quality. These standards and, particularly, the threshold to identify failing
schools are expected to be important aspects of the impact of school inspections as
school officials would select the action that they perceive to have the highest
yield, given their planning horizon, budget and appetite for risk. Hanushek and
Raymond (2002), for example, found failing schools in the USA on the brink of
being sanctioned to make dramatic improvements in the year after identification of
these failures. Schools having scores close to the threshold of being sanctioned
altered their behaviour more than schools further away from that threshold.
Some studies also suggest that sanctions and rewards have a positive effect on
educational quality in schools. The operating assumption in these studies is that schools
work harder to perform well when something valuable is to be gained or lost;
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information and feedback alone are seen as insufficient to motivate schools to perform
to high standards (Malen 1999; Elmore and Fuhrman 2001; Nichols et al. 2006). Weak
and very weak schools that fail to improve within 2 years after the first assessment can
be put forward for financial and/or administrative sanctions by the Ministry of
Education, while they are also placed on a list of failing schools on the internet to
inform the local community and parents. Penzer (CfBT 2011) explains how such
inspection consequences discipline schools to accept unfavourable inspection
conclusions.
During inspection visits of weak and very weak schools, inspectors also give
feedback about specific weaknesses in the performance of schools on inspection
standards, while sometimes also providing advice on how to improve. Such feedback
and advice further motivate improvement and inform professional development, par-
ticularly when the feedback is clear and explicit, when it is matched by an assessment
of weak points as unsatisfactory, when it is provided in a constructive manner and when
there is an agreement between an inspector and the school to address the feedback in an
improvement plan (such as in weak and very weak schools) (Matthews and Sammons
2004; Dobbelaer et al. 2013; Ehren and Visscher 2008; Gray and Gardner 1999; Erdem
and Yaprak 2013; Kelchtermans 2007).
The intensive inspection feedback to weak and very weak schools, their intense
monitoring and support for improvement are thus expected to result in more (rapid)
improvement of these schools compared to schools in the basic inspection category.
The next section will explain the methodology used to study these assumptions.
5 Methodology
The study compared changes in student attainment and additional performance indica-
tors in secondary schools that have been assigned to different inspection treatment
categories (basic, weak, very weak) following an early warning analysis in 2011.
Multilevel random effect models were used to compare performance of schools in
the basic category to schools in the weak/very weak category over a period of 4 years
on a set of indicators described below.
5.1 Selection of schools
The schools in our study include a sample of HAVO/VWO schools. A two-stage
sampling design was used to select these schools. The sampling design builds from
the categories the inspectorate of education uses to classify schools and assign them to
different inspection treatments (basic, weak, very weak). The results from the early
warning analysis in May 2011 were used to select secondary schools from different
inspection categories. HAVO and VWO departments that were not included in the early
warning analysis of the inspectorate or had not been assigned to an inspection arrange-
ment were considered out of scope. The target population of secondary schools was
therefore set to 454 schools (including both a HAVO and VWO department), of the
total of 548 Dutch HAVO/VWO schools. The target sample included almost all HAVO
and VWO departments in three different inspection treatments to reach sufficient
response rates.
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Due to the limited number of schools in the ‘very weak’ inspection category, all
schools in this category were included in the sample. In year 1, 17 (6 %) schools were
classified as either weak or very weak. In year 2, 12 (4%) schools were classified as either
weak or very weak. In year 3, seven (3 %) schools were classified as either weak or very
weak. There are 24 schools that are categorized as either inspection category weak or very
weak. Some of these schools are categorized as weak or very weak on more than one
occasion; i.e. they are in the same category for either 2 years of the survey or for 3 years.
Table 1 compares schools in the basic and (very) weak inspection categories on a
number of performance indicators. A t test (comparing schools in the basic category
versus schools in the very weak and weak categories) indicated no significant differ-
ences on any of the indicators.
The national non-profit organization ‘Schoolinfo’ provided us with secondary data
on the majority of these schools (266, 88 %) at four time points between 2009 and 2013
(the year prior to the early warning analysis, year 1, year 2 and year 3). These data
allowed us to measure change in the number of students in the school, parent and
student satisfaction, scheduled and taught hours, the number of external evaluations,
Table 1 Performance of schools in basic/weak category
Year 2009–2010 (prior to
early warning analysis)
Schools in the
basic category
Schools in the
weak category
Schools in the very
weak category
School size Mean Mean Mean
810 716 522
Average grade school exam Dutch literacy HAVOa 6.41 6.38 6.10
Average grade central exam Dutch literacy HAVO 6.03 5.98 6.15
Average grade school exam Mathematics HAVO 6.23 6.45 6.35
Average grade central exam Mathematics HAVO 6.28 6.50 6.55
Average grade school exam Dutch literacy VWO 6.74 6.73 7.05
Average grade central exam Dutch literacy VWO 6.20 6.28 6.50
Average grade school exam Mathematics VWO 6.42 6.52 6.60
Average grade central exam Mathematics VWO 6.21 6.32 6.20
Throughput lower grades HAVOb 96 % 95 % 97 %
Throughput lower grades VWO 96 % 95 % 97 %
Throughput upper grades HAVO 65,7 % 68,0 % 64,9 %
Throughput upper grades VWO 65,7 % 68,0 % 64,9 %
Percentage of students in poverty area 7.01 % 7.32 % 6.92 %
Average student satisfaction (scale of 1–10) 6.68 7.07 5.89
Average parent satisfaction (scale of 1–10) 7.01 7.32 6.92
Scheduled number of teaching hours HAVO 1054 1040 1081
Actual number of taught hours HAVO 1056 975 1015
Scheduled number of teaching hours VWO 1016 1040 1081
Actual number of taught hours VWO 997 961 1026
Percentage sick leave of school staff 4,4 % 4,1 % .
a Grades are given on a 1–10 scale where a ‘6’ is a pass
b Percentages throughput represent students not repeating a grade
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student achievement on school and central exams, and throughput indicators of lower
and upper grades (i.e. number of students progressing without repeating a grade). Data
from 2009–2010 acted as a baseline before the early warning analysis of the inspec-
torate and the assignment of schools to different inspection categories. Table 2 sum-
marizes the available data for the 4 years of data collection.
Unfortunately, Schoolinfo does not have data on all the performance indicators of all
the schools for the 4 years of our data collection. Table 3 shows the patterns of
missingness within the secondary school data. In the column labelled pattern, ‘1’
represents a response and the ‘.’ represents a missing value. Therefore, the response
pattern ‘.1.’ refers to schools that only have responses at one time point, which is the
second time point.
5.2 Data analysis
Random effect models (also known as multilevel models) with GLS estimation were
used to test changes over time and the interaction between inspection category and
time. This analysis indicates if ‘basic’ versus ‘weak/very weak’ schools respond
differently when faced with different inspection assessments and treatments. Due to
the very small number of schools categorized as very weak, this category has been
combined with the ‘weak’ category to create a binary variable of inspection category
(basic versus weak/very weak). This approach provided the most flexibility with the
small sample size and the small number of time points. Furthermore, random effect
models can alleviate problems with missing data through the use of maximum likeli-
hood methods (Quene and van den Bergh 2004). The random effect model takes into
account the dependence of the observations. Another way to think about this is that
time points are nested within schools. The analysis was conducted using Stata version
13 (StataCorp 2013). Scale scores were constructed by performing factor analysis on
the polychoric correlation matrices using the pairwise option. Scale scores were
predicted using the regression method (DiStefano et al. 2009; Thurstone 1934). The
analysis is conducted on the predicted scale scores. A main effect of inspection
category is included to test whether the initial values of the scales, the intercepts, are
influenced by the inspection category of the school. Here, we only provide detailed
reports of significant differences.
6 Results: changes over time in secondary school student attainment
This section describes changes in student achievement as measured in school exams
and in national standardized exams in a number of different subjects (Dutch literacy,
mathematics A and B, geography, chemistry, biology, economics A and B) by aca-
demic track (VWO or HAVO). We particularly looked at whether schools in different
inspection treatment categories (weak/very weak versus basic) have different processes
of change after having been placed in an inspection category and whether there is a
difference in the level of change of core subjects versus other subjects. A graphical
display of the results of the hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) is provided followed
by a table containing the coefficients from the HLM models. The results for the subject
grades are divided into school and central exam grades and by whether the exam grades
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relate to the VWO track (pre-university education track) or the HAVO track (general
higher education track).
Table 2 Overview of data collection
Year 2009–2010 Year 2010–2011 Year 2011–2012 Year 2012–2013
• Number of students
2009–2010
• Number of students
in exams per
profile 2009–2010
• Average grade school
exam per subject
2009–201031
• Average grade central
exam per subject
2009–2010
• Throughput lower
grades 2009–201042
• Throughput upper
grades 2009–2010
• Number of students
2009–2010 in APC
(poverty area)
• Number of students
2009–2010 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Percentage of
students 2009–2010
in APC
(poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2009–2010 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Average student
satisfaction
2009–2010
• Average parent
satisfaction
2009–2010
• Scheduled teaching
hours per department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2009–2010
• Actual taught hours
per department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2009–2010
• Percentage of staff on
sick leave 2009
• Number of students
2010–2011
• Number of students
in exams per profile
2010–2011
• Average grade school
exam per subject
2010–2011
• Average grade central
exam per subject
2010–2011
• Throughput lower
grades 2010–2011
• Throughput upper
grades 2010–2011
• Number of students
2010–2011 in APC
(poverty area)
• Number of students
2010–2011 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2010–2011 in APC
(poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2010–2011 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Average student
satisfaction
2010–2011
• Average parent
satisfaction
2010–2011
• Scheduled teaching
hours per department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2010–2011
• Actual taught hours
per department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2010–2011
• Percentage of staff
on sick leave 2010
• Number of students
2011 2012
• Number of students in
exams per profile
2011–2012
• Average grade school
exam per subject
2011–2012
• Average grade central
exam per subject
2011–2012
• Throughput lower
grades 2011–2012
• Throughput upper
grades 2011–2012
• Number of students
2011–2012 in APC
(poverty area)
• Number of students
2011–2012 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2011–2012 in APC
(poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2011–2012 NOT in
APC (poverty area)
• Average student
satisfaction
2011–2012
• Average parent
satisfaction
2011–2012
• Scheduled teaching
hours per department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2011–2012
• Actual taught hours per
department
(HAVO/VWO) per
year 2011–2012
• Number of external
evaluations
2011–2012
• Percentage of staff on
sick leave 2011
• Number of students
2012 2013
• Number of students
2012–2013 in APC
(poverty area)
• Number of students
2012–2013 NOT
in APC (poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2012–2013 in APC
(poverty area)
• Percentage of students
2012–2013 NOT
in APC (poverty area)
• Average student satisfaction
2012–2013
• Average parent satisfaction
2012 2013
• Number of external
evaluations 2012–2013
31Subjects included in the study are Dutch literacy, Mathematics (A and B), Geography, Chemistry, Biology,
Economics A and B).
42Throughput represents percentage of students not repeating a grade.
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The results indicate that changes in Dutch literacy grades differed by inspection
category, particularly for the average school exam grade in Dutch for VWO and for the
central exam grade in Dutch for HAVO (Table 4).
As shown in Fig. 1, students in the VWO academic track in schools in the
weak/very weak category (estimate = 6.85, SE = 0.05) initially scored significant-
ly higher on the school exams compared to students in schools in the basic
category of inspection (estimate = 6.74, SE = 0.02). However, the scores declined
on the school exams in Dutch literacy over the 3 years so that in year 3, they
scored on average less than students in schools in the basic category of inspection.
Students in schools in the basic category of inspection did not show the same
decline in scores over time. The differences between the inspection categories
were significantly different in year 3 for students in the VWO track, with students
in schools in the weak/very weak inspection category (estimate = 6.56, SE = 0.07)
scoring significantly lower than students in schools in the basic inspection cate-
gory (estimate = 6.56, SE = 0.02). Indeed, there was a significant interaction
between school exam grades in Dutch literacy for students in the VWO track
(chi2(2) = 7.72, p < 0.05). A similar pattern, although much less pronounced, was
displayed for the students in the HAVO track, but these differences were not
statistically significant (chi2(2) = 1.79, p > 0.05).
There is also some evidence, shown in Fig. 2, that scores on the average central
exam grade in Dutch differed by inspection category over time. There is a
significant interaction between changes in the central exam grades over time and
inspection category of the school for students in the HAVO academic track
(chi2(2) = 6.75, p < 0.05). Students in schools in inspection category weak/very
weak in the HAVO track (estimate = 5.90, SE = 0.05) initially have lower scores
on the central exam than students in schools in the basic inspection category
(estimate = 6.02, SE = 0.01). However, between year 1 and year 2, this changes
and students in schools in inspection category weak/very weak have higher scores
(estimate = 6.24, SE = 0.06) than students in schools in the basic inspection
category (estimate = 6.15, 0.02). By year 3, there is little discernible difference
Table 3 The pattern of missingness for additional data of secondary schools
Freq. Percent Cum. Pattern
266 88.37 88.37 1111
13 4.32 92.69 .1.
3 1 93.69 .11
3 1 94.68 .11.
3 1 95.68 1...
2 0.66 96.35 ...1
2 0.66 97.01 .1.
2 0.66 97.67 .111
2 0.66 98.34 11.
5 1.66 100 (other patterns)
301 100 XXXX
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Table 4 Testing the association between school inspection category and changes in Dutch language and
literature grades over time
Est SE Z p value 95 % Confidence
intervals
Dutch school VWO
Year
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 −0.05 0.01 −3.52 0.00 −0.07 −0.02
Year 3 −0.08 0.01 −5.98 0.00 −0.11 −0.05
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak 0.10 0.05 2.16 0.03 0.01 0.20
Year × inspection category
Year 2 × weak −0.12 0.06 −1.95 0.05 −0.25 0.00
Year 3 × weak −0.21 0.08 −2.54 0.01 −0.37 −0.05
Intercept 6.74 0.02 437.47 0.00 6.71 6.77
sigma_u 0.21
sigma_e 0.15
rho 0.65
Test of interaction chi2(2) = 7.72, p = 0.021
Dutch school HAVO
Year
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 −0.03 0.01 −2.82 0.01 −0.06 −0.01
Year 3 −0.02 0.01 −1.22 0.22 −0.04 0.01
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak 0.03 0.04 0.64 0.52 −0.06 0.11
Year × inspection category
Year 2 × weak/very weak −0.07 0.06 −1.28 0.20 −0.19 0.04
Year 3 × weak/very weak −0.06 0.07 −0.81 0.42 −0.20 0.08
Intercept 6.40 0.01 488.37 0.00 6.37 6.42
sigma_u 0.17
sigma_e 0.14
rho 0.59
Test of interaction chi2(2) = 1.79, p = 0.409
Dutch central VWO
Year
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 0.05 0.02 2.45 0.01 0.01 0.08
Year 3 0.23 0.02 11.89 0.00 0.19 0.26
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak −0.07 0.06 −1.07 0.28 −0.19 0.06
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between schools in the different inspection categories (weak/very weak esti-
mate = 6.24, SE = 0.08; basic estimate = 6.22, SE = 0.01). There is also no
significant interaction between inspection category and year of the study for the
average central exam grades in the HAVO track. A similar patterning of results
was found for students in the VWO track, but the differences between the
inspection categories were smaller at year 1 (weak/very weak estimate = 6.23,
SE = 0.16; basic estimate = 6.20, SE = 0.02), and the interaction over time was
not statistically significant (chi2(2) = 4.19, p = 0.122).
7 Results: changes over time in other performance indicators
Finally, we looked at changes in other indicators, such as student/parent satisfac-
tion, numbers and ratios of students to staff as outlined in Table 2. The results
Table 4 (continued)
Est SE Z p value 95 % Confidence
intervals
Year × inspection category
Year 2 × weak/very weak 0.18 0.09 2.02 0.04 0.01 0.35
Year 3 × weak/very weak 0.04 0.11 0.40 0.69 −0.17 0.26
Intercept 6.20 0.02 363.37 0.00 6.17 6.23
sigma_u 0.18
sigma_e 0.22
rho 0.40
Test of interaction chi2(2) = 4.19, p = 0.122
Dutch central HAVO
Year
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 0.14 0.02 8.35 0.00 0.11 0.17
Year 3 0.20 0.02 12.44 0.00 0.17 0.24
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak −0.11 0.05 −2.02 0.04 −0.22 0.00
Year × inspection category
Year 2 × weak/very weak 0.20 0.08 2.55 0.01 0.05 0.35
Year 3 × weak/very weak 0.13 0.10 1.37 0.17 −0.06 0.32
Intercept 6.02 0.01 414.03 0.00 5.99 6.05
sigma_u 0.15
sigma_e 0.19
rho 0.38
Test of interaction chi2(2) = 6.75, p = 0.034
There is no evidence of differential changes in the maths A and B, geography, chemistry, biology and
economics grades on school or on central exams over time by inspection category.
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indicate that schools in the two inspection categories particularly differ in their
changes in student satisfaction scores, the number of students per full-time
employee and the number of students in the school over time. There is no
evidence of differential changes in parental satisfaction, the ratio of students to
management full-time employees, the ratio of students to teacher full-time em-
ployees, the proportion of students living in poverty areas and the proportion of
sick leave days over time by inspection category.
7.1 Student satisfaction
Student satisfaction scores changed differently by inspection category over time
(chi2(2) = 6.20, p < 0.05). Initially, student satisfaction scores are very similar in
the inspection categories (weak/very weak estimate = 6.79, SE = 0.10; basic
estimate = 6.78, SE = 0.03). By year 2, students in schools that are in inspection
category weak/very weak report significantly lower satisfaction than students in
schools in the basic category of inspection (weak/very weak estimate = 6.46,
SE = 0.12; basic estimate = 6.75, SE = 0.03). Between years 2 and 3, the scores
for student satisfaction for students in school classified as weak/very weak in-
creased significantly (weak/very weak estimate = 7.04, SE = 0.23), whereas
satisfaction scores for students in schools in the basic inspection category only
slightly increased (basic estimate = 6.83, SE = 0.03) (Table 5; Fig. 3).
Fig. 1 Changes in average school exam grade in Dutch by inspection category
Fig. 2 Changes in average central exam grade in Dutch by inspection category
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7.2 Number of students per full-time employee
In year 1 and year 2, the number of students per full-time employee is very similar in
schools in both inspection categories. There is, however, evidence that in year 3, the
number of students per full-time employee was significantly lower in schools in the
weak/very weak inspection category compared to schools in the basic inspection
category. The actual average difference between the inspection category groups is
approximately 0.5 (weak/very weak estimate = 11.03, SE = 0.23; basic estimate = 11.55,
SE = 0.08), which means that, in schools that are in the inspection category weak/very
Table 5 Testing the association between school inspection category and changes in student satisfaction over
time
Student satisfaction Estimate SE Z p value 95 % Confidence intervals
Time
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 −0.03 0.03 −1.01 0.31 −0.09 0.03
Year 3 0.04 0.03 1.39 0.17 −0.02 0.10
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.92 −0.20 0.22
Time × inspection
Year 2 × weak −0.30 0.16 −1.91 0.06 −0.60 0.01
Year 3 × weak 0.20 0.24 0.84 0.40 −0.27 0.68
Intercept 6.78 0.03 251.49 0.00 6.72 6.83
sigma_u 0.28
sigma_e 0.27
rho 0.51
Test of interaction between time and inspection category chi2(2) = 6.20, p = 0.045
Fig. 3 Changes in student satisfaction by inspection category
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weak, there was approximately half a pupil less per full-time employee on average
compared to schools in inspection category basic (Table 6; Fig. 4).
7.3 Total number of students
There is also a significant interaction between the number of students in the school over
time and the inspection category of the school (chi2(2) = 15.86, p < 0.05). There is very
little change in the number of students in the school over time for schools in the basic
inspection category (year 1 estimate = 784.5, SE = 19.3; year 2 estimate = 788.1,
SE = 19.3; year 3 estimate = 787.7, SE = 19.3). However, schools in the weak/very
Table 6 Testing the association between school inspection category and changes in the ratio of students per
full-time employee over time
Students per FTE Estimate SE Z p value 95 % Confidence intervals
Time
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 0.36 0.04 8.43 0.00 0.28 0.44
Year 3 0.63 0.04 14.90 0.00 0.55 0.71
Inspection category
Basic Reference
Weak/very weak 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.88 −0.29 0.34
Time × inspection
Year 2 × weak 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.95 −0.39 0.42
Year 3 × weak −0.55 0.26 −2.12 0.03 −1.05 −0.04
Intercept 10.92 0.08 134.31 0.00 10.76 11.08
sigma_u 1.27
sigma_e 0.47
rho 0.88
Test of interaction between time and inspection category chi2(2) = 5.30, p = 0.071
Fig. 4 Changes in students per FTE by inspection category
Educ Asse Eval Acc
weak inspection category start with a significantly higher number of students than
schools in the basic category (39 more students on average). In year 2, there are no
differences in the number of students by inspection category, but by year 3, schools in
inspection category weak/very weak have fewer students (71 fewer on average) than
schools in the basic inspection category. Changes in student to staff ratios are either the
result of taking on more staff or taking on fewer students. The results here suggest that
there are fewer students attending schools that are in the weak/very weak inspection
category. As parents are free to choose a school, they may have opted out of the
weak/very weak schools and entered their child in a higher performing school.
Alternatively, schools may have enrolled fewer students to make better use of their
resources and staff and improve performance. Unfortunately, the mechanism cannot be
tested with these data (Table 7; Fig. 5).
8 Conclusion and discussion
Many inspectorates of education have recently moved towards more proportional risk-
based inspection models, targeting high-risk schools for visits, while schools with
satisfactory student attainment levels are excluded from inspections. The Bratislava
memorandum of the European Association of Inspectorates of Education (SICI) even
mentions such models as a way forward towards more agile methods of school
inspections. This paper looks into these newer inspection models and aims to enhance
our understanding of the potential effectiveness of such targeted models on student
attainment and other performance indicators. We particularly looked into the impact of
the introduction of risk-based inspections in the Netherlands in 2008, analyzing
Table 7 Testing the association between school inspection category and changes in the number of students in
the school over time
Number of students in school Estimate SE Z p value 95 % Confidence intervals
Time
Year 1 Reference
Year 2 3.59 4.58 0.78 0.43 −5.38 12.56
Year 3 3.17 4.58 0.69 0.49 −5.80 12.14
Inspection category
Basis Reference
Zwak/zeer zwak 39.37 17.53 2.25 0.03 5.01 73.73
Time × inspection
Year 2 × zwak −16.70 21.68 −0.77 0.44 −59.18 25.79
Year 3 × zwak −110.67 28.19 −3.93 0.00 −165.92 −55.41
Intercept 784.52 19.28 40.69 0.00 746.73 822.31
sigma_u 320.32
sigma_e 51.53
rho 0.97
Test of interaction between time and inspection category chi2(2) = 15.86, p = 0.000
Educ Asse Eval Acc
changes in schools that are placed in different inspection treatment categories after the
early warning analysis. Using data from the non-for-profit organization Schoolinfo on
students’ attainment in a number of subjects as well as in other indicators (e.g. student/
parent satisfaction), we analyzed whether there are differences in how schools in
different inspection categories (basic versus weak/very weak) change over a period
of 3 years and whether there are differences in changes on the indicators that are part of
the early warning analysis (student attainment and student numbers) and indicators
excluded from the framework (e.g. student/parent satisfaction).
As school inspections have been in place for many years, albeit in different guises
and with different foci, our findings are exploratory at best and do not allow for strong
causal conclusions about the overall effect of inspections. Even though we analyzed
changes in schools before and after the introduction of a new risk-based inspection
model, many schools will have known about upcoming changes and will have prepared
themselves for these changes. Such preparations may have diluted our findings in
preventing us from finding significant differences in changes between weak/very weak
schools and those in the basic inspection category. The small number of weak and very
weak schools in our study will also limit the number of significant differences that we
will find in performance of these schools compared to schools in the basic category,
potentially underestimating the actual effect of risk-based inspections. Our models,
however, do allow for an exploration of the differences in improvement trajectories
between the two groups of schools on a range of indicators (both in and outside of the
inspection framework) over a short period of time. Such findings provide insights into
the types of changes in schools following targeted inspections.
8.1 Changes in student attainment of schools in different inspection categories
The results indicate differences in changes in student achievement results in secondary
schools, but only in Dutch literacy. These differences become more prominent over
time and are particularly significant in the second and third years after the early warning
analysis, suggesting that it takes 2 to 3 years for inspection visits to have an impact on
student attainment. Weak/very weak schools in the VWO track showed a decline in
Fig. 5 Changes in the number of students in the school by inspection category
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school exam results in Dutch language compared to (stable) scores in the VWO schools
in the basic category, whereas weak/very weak schools in the HAVO track show
increasing scores on the central exam results in Dutch language compared to schools
in the basic category.
The decline in school exam scores may be explained by schools marking their own
school exams stricter, following more strict guidelines of the inspectorate. A previous
study by De Lange and Dronkers (2007) showed a large gap between students’ scores
on school and central exams, suggesting that schools try to improve their pass rates and
their position in league tables by boosting students’ grades on the school exams. As a
result, the inspectorate of education added an indicator to their assessment framework,
which restricts the difference between the two scores. This may have resulted in
weak/very weak schools marking their own school exams stricter, which would lead
to a decline in scores.
Another explanation is the unstandardized nature of school exams and potential
unreliable marking, which may have resulted in fluctuation of and a potential decline of
results. However, the availability of marking scripts, as well as second marking of
school exams, suggests that there is a high level of scrutiny of these exams, which
would prevent error in measuring differences between schools in the two inspection
categories, as well as incorrect measurement of changes in school performance over
time.
8.2 Changes in other performance indicators in schools in different inspection
categories
We also analyzed differential changes in other performance indicators between schools
in different inspection categories, expecting the most changes in weak/very weak
schools on indicators part of the early warning analysis of the inspectorate of education
(student numbers). Our results only show differences in changes in student satisfaction,
student-staff ratios and number of full-time students in weak/very weak schools
compared to schools in the basic inspection category, suggesting that schools do not
specifically target improvement on indicators in the early warning analysis. Student
satisfaction declined, as well as student numbers and student-staff ratios in weak and
very weak schools over time. This would suggest that students are less likely to choose
schools that are evaluated as weak or very weak by the inspectorate, and students in
weak and very weak schools become less satisfied when the school is assessed to be
failing. Such a decline in student satisfaction may result from an overall lack of morale
in the school, following a negative inspection assessment, or may be caused by the fact
that time and effort go into raising student achievement in core subjects to the
disadvantage of other subjects or activities in the school, creating a range of side effects
such as lack of morale for long-term improvement or narrowing the curriculum to
tested subjects and content.
The improved scores on the central examination in literacy only 2 years after the
inspection visit raise further concerns about potential unintended consequences of risk-
based inspections. van den Berg and Vandenberghe (1981), Stringfield (2002) and
Visscher (2002) found that complex change generally takes 5 to 10 years to result in
higher student outcomes, suggesting that the improvement activities in our study
schools were potentially aimed at short-term gains, implemented under high pressure
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to show speedy results. The fact that the timeline of improved scores coincides with the
inspection consequences for failing schools, where sanctions kick in 2 to 3 years after
their categorization as weak or very weak, supports such a claim.
These results lead us to question whether risk-based inspection models are the best
way forward. This takes us back to our initial reflection on drawbacks of risk-based
inspections and whether the early warning methodology allows for a detection of high-
risk schools.
De Wolf and Honingh (2014) suggest that risk-based models are best placed in
settings where risks are actually known and measurable and where inspectorates are
capable of taking into account the level of uncertainty that comes with using a risk-
based model. It is questionable whether risks of declining quality are actually measur-
able in education, given the multiple causes of decline and the great variety of contexts
in which schools operate and that affect their performance. Risks are particularly
unpredictable in settings of large variety in the inspected organization, such as schools
with different student populations in different urban and rural contexts, where services
are delivered in interaction of different providers (e.g. teachers, school boards, after
school care organizations responsible for aspects of teaching and the school’s organi-
zation) and when there is limited data available to inform an early warning analysis. In
such situations, accurate prediction of risks is difficult according to De Wolf and
Honingh (2014) and is often not more than a best guess. As Ehren and Honingh
(2011) outline, the focus on student achievement in the Dutch early warning analysis
does not actually allow for an analysis of risks as the performance of schools is already
failing when they are identified for targeted inspections; inspection visits become a
remedy for failing schools instead of a model to prevent such failure and improve the
performance of all schools in the education system.
Power (1999) also suggests that auditing labels, such as the ones from an early
warning analysis of schools with/without risks, do not invite or provoke public
dialogue as they do not contribute to the empowerment of external parties, such as
parents or students. The labels of schools in different inspection categories and lack of
reports of schools in the ‘basic category’ limit the opportunities of parents, students and
other stakeholders external to the school to enter into communication and dialogue with
the school about further improvements. The model of early warning analysis excludes a
large group of schools in the basic inspection category from feedback and conversa-
tions about further improvement and implies a shift from a highly interactive inspection
to a primary paper-based audit exercise, assuming that such interactive and broad-based
inspections and evaluations are now organized by schools in their horizontal account-
ability arrangements. Several authors have argued that such models of external audits
and checks of internal systems for self-inspection are the best chance of effective
regulation (Braithwaite 1989), but others particularly highlight the ‘ritualization’ of
evaluations where the focus is shifted from the evaluation of the ‘quality of one’s
deeds’ to the ‘quality of one’s records’ (Power 1999).
Power (1999) has also pointed to potential goal displacement of audits when
auditing becomes an organizational ritual and loses its relevance of having an impact
on the objects that it evaluates and controls. Such goal displacement is particularly
relevant in the context of risk-based inspections where the definition of high-quality
teaching and learning is narrowed down to a small number of indicators used in the
early warning analysis. Examples of such goal displacement were highlighted by De
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Wolf and Honingh (2014) who found that the use of risk-based models lowered
expectations of Dutch schools that now feel that having no risks equals good perfor-
mance. This conclusion has already led the Dutch Inspectorate of Education to revisit
their inspection model and to increase the intensity of their inspections of schools in the
basic category, introducing more differentiated targets for these schools and providing
all these schools with regular feedback on their performance and sharing good practises
of high-performing schools across the system. As such models are more costly and
require more visits to schools, it remains to be seen whether other countries that have
introduced risk-based, proportionate models will follow suit.
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